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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
taxpayer to deduct all the expenses incurred for her meals and lodging
and a "reasonable amount for incidental expenses."
The significance of this decision lies in its liberal construction of the
medical deduction provision of the 1939 code on the part of the district
courts in the sixth circuit.' 9 Furthermore, it supports the proposition generally accepted that the district courts favor a more liberal construction
of the revenue code than the Tax Court.20 . However, since no cases involving the item of transportation essential to medical care and having application
under the 1954 code have been reported, one can reasonably assume that the
decisions and rules set forth in the cases decided under the 1939 code will
be applicable. The principal case seems to go far in finding that the trip
taken by the taxpayer and his wife was primarily for the alleviation and
cure of the taxpayer's stroke. Under the present tax law the problem, in
this regard, is essentially the same. Taxpayers might certainly be justified
in claiming the deduction here involved whenever possible.
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A workmen's compensation claimant brought suit against the compensation carrier and a detective agency employed to investigate the claim.
It was alleged that the claimant suffered damages due to mental distress
caused by the unreasonable mamicr in which investigations were conducted.
The action was dismissed and plaintiff appealed. Held, reversed, the investigative activities, if unreasonable, constituted an invasion of the right of
privacy. Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, 38 So.2d 716 (La. 1956).
Since the right of privacy was not recognized at the old common law,
the courts that have considered the question have been absorbed in deciding
whether such a right exists. It was not until 1904 that a state court of last
resort, in Pavesich v. New England Life Inc. Co.,' perceived that a person
had a legal right "to be let alouc' 2 - a purely personal right 3 unsupported
19. Generally, district courts follow the previous decisions of other courts in the
same circuit but are not bound by the decisions rendered in other circuits.
20. Both courts have original jurisdiction over tax questions. The taxpayer has the
choice of contesting the disputed tax assessment in the tax Court before paying the

assessment, or paying the assessment and bringing his suite in the District Court for a
refund. (Originally the tax court was an administrative board, but although still techni-

cally a board, has since acquired the character, respect and dignity of a true court).

1. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1904).
2. CooLr, ToRTs, 2d Ed., 29 (1888).
3. The definition most frequently quoted by the courts appears in 41 Az.JuR.,
Privacy, § I1 (1939). "In order to constitute an invasion of the right of privacy, an act
must be of such a nature as a reasonable man could see might and probably would cause
mental distress and injury to anyone possessed of ordinary feelings and intelligence, situated in like cimcumstances as the complainant, and this question is to some extent
one of law."

CASENOTES
by property rights or breach of contract or trust. rhis prescient Georgia
court, influenced by a provocative article by Warren and Brandeis, 4 emphatically rejected the holding of a then famous New York case.' Today,
the overwhelming majority" of the courts that have adjudicated the question
have affirmed the existence of the right of privacy, and have held that the
invasion of such right is a tort. A few jurisdictions deny the right,7 and
several other states limit it by statute.8 Because recognition of the right
is in its infancy, the law surrounding it is somewhat amorphous.9
The applicability of the law of privacy is most clearly defined where
some element of a person's personality has been appropriated for commercial use. Although emphasizing the mental aspect, the courts have
created something of a property right in personal attributes, granting relief
frequently where the defendant made unauthorized use of an individual's
name or picture in an advertisement. 10 Even in those jurisdictions which

4. The Right to Privacy, 4 lIARV. L. REV. 198 (1890). This article is quoted in
43 out of the 61 cases cited in this note.
5. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
(Defendant used the picture of the plaintiff, a pretty young girl, to advertise its flour
without her consent. Relief was denied on the basis of the purely mental nature of the
injury, lack of precedent, and fear of a "vast amount of litigation" which might follow.
This decision proved so unpopular that a justice was moved to defend his position by
writing an article.) See note 3, 18 NOTRE D.ME LAw. 161 (1942). In 1903 N.Y.
enacted a remedial statute: New YORK CIVIL RIrHTs LAw, § 5-51.
6. Ala.: Abernathy v. Thornton, 83 So.2d 235 (1955); Alaska: Smith v. Sitratt, 7
Alaska 416 (1928); Ariz.: Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133
(1945); Cal.: Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38 Cal.2d 273, 231 P.2d (1951); Dist. of Col.:
Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F.Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955); Peay v. Curtis
Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948); Fla.: Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So.2d
243 (1944); Ga.: Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, S.E. 194 (1930); Ill.:
Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E,2d 742 (1952); Iowa: Bremmer
v. Journal-Tribune Pub. Co., 76 N.W.2d 762 (1956); Ind.: Continental Optical Co. v.
Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949); Kan.: Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883,
172 P. 532 (1918); Ky: Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931); La.:
Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 82 So.2d 61 (1954); Mich.: Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W.2d 911 (1948); Mo.: Barber v. Time, Inc.,
348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W. 2d 291 (1942); Mont.: Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517,
241 P.2d 816 (1952); Nev.: Norman v. City of Las Vegas, 64 Nev. 38, 177 P.2d 442
1947); N.J.: Frey v. Dixon, 141 N.J. Eq. 481, 58 A.2d 86 (1948); N.C.: Flake v.
reensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938); Ohio: Housh v. Peth, 165
Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956); Or.: Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Or. 482,
113 P.2d 438 (1941); Pa.: Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F. 2d 974 (3rd Cir. 1951);
S.C.: Holloman v. Life Ins. Co., 192 S.C. 454, 7 S.E.2d 169 (1940).
7. Neb.: Brunson v. Rouke Army Store. 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1956);
RI.: Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909); Texas: McCullagh v.
Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 211 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1954); Wis.: Yoeckel v. Samonig,
75 N.W. 2d 965 (1956). See 1952 Wis. L.REv. 507.
8. N.Y.: Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 278 App.Div. 431, 106 N.Y.S.2d 553, aff'd
304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E. 2d 485 (1952). See note 5 supra. Utah: UTAH CODE ANN.
76-4-7 to 76-4-9 1953); Va.: VA. CODE § 8-650 (1950).
9. DICrLER, Right of Privacy; a proposed redefinition, 70 U.S.L. 435 (1937) (classifies the tort as to (1) intrusion, (2) publicity, (3) appropriations).
10. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938); Kunz v.
Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918); Foster-Milbum Co. v. Cbinn, 134 Ky. 424,
120 S.W. 364 (1909); Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 I11.App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742
(1952); Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E. 2d 306 (1949);
21125 V. Crowley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.V.2d 911 (1948).
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deny the right per se, statutics have been enacted to prevent such practices."

\Vhere the purely mental character of the tort has been the sole basis for
relief, a cause of action has been held to lic where publication concerning
a person transcended ordinary decencies; 12 or where there has been an
intrusion upon an individual's right to solitude.13 The privilege of the
press to publish newsworthy facts is an important limitation on the right
of privacy. 4 However, the right is not extended to include the supersensitive but is designed to protect persons of ordinary sensibilities.' 5 Since the
right is purely personal, the cause of action does not survive the plaintiff.' 6
A fortiori, a child too young to suffer mental distress"7 or an "artificial
person""' (corporation or partnership) cannot maintain the action. Although
no special monetary damages need be alleged, recovery of substantial damages
may be allowed for the infliction of mental suffering. Unlike the torts of
20
defamation, libel, and slander, truth is no defense.
Where the facts presented, as in the instant case, have involved the

11. See note 8 supra.
12. Kirby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942) (letters which seem: to suggest an assignation were sent to 1000 men over actress's supposed
signature); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931) (motion picture revived the career of a reformed prostitute who was a defendant in a notorious murder
trial); Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930) (publication
of a picture of a deformed child); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.A. 967 (1927)
(defendant publicized fact that a doctor had not paid his debt); State ex relMavity
v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946) (plaintiff's picture included in rogue's
gallery after he had been acquitted of any crime); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199,
58 S.W.2d 291 (1942) (plaintiff's picture published along with story about hospitalized
"starving gluttton").
13. Walker v. Whittle, 83 Ga, App. 445, 64 S.E.2d 87 (1951) (unlawful entry
by an officer); Byfield v. Candler, 33 Ga. App. 275, 125 S.E. 905 (1924) (entering
a woman's stateroom aboard a boat); Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d
816 (1952) (entry by a landlord); Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46
(1931) (wiretapping); But see Schmuckler v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., Ohio C.P. 1953, 116
N.E.2d 819 (1953) (telephone companay privileged to monitor call where plaintiff suspected of practicing fraud against the company).
14. Bremmer v. Journal Tribune Pub. Co., 76 N.W. 2d 762 Iowa (1956); Jacova
v. Southern Radio and Television Co., 82 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1955); See PRossrna, ToRrs 97
(2d ed. 1955); Warren & Brandeis, note 4 supra; Nizer, Right of Privacy, 39 Micl.
LAw Rvv. 526 (1941).
15. Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E.22 (1895) . . - there must be some
reasonable and plausible ground for the existence of this mental distress and injury ...
It must not be the creature of mere caprice nor of pure fancy, not the result of a supersensitive and morbid mental organization."
16. Schumann v. Loew's, Inc., 135 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (contains a
statement of the law concerning survival of the action in all jurisdictions.)
17. Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930); Douglas
v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652,
134 SW. 1076 (1911).
18. Maysville Transit Co. v. Ort, 296 Ky. 524. 177 S.W. 2d 369 (1943); Vassar
College v.Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 F. 982 (D. Mo. 1912).
19. Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945); Hinish
v.Meier & Frank Co., 166 Or. 428, 113 P2d 438 (1941).
20. Man v. Rio Grande Oil Co., 28 F. Supp. 845 (D.Cal. 1939); Melvin v. Reid,
112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P.91 (1931); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.w. 967
(1927).

CASENOTES
"trailing or following" of another, a mere handful of cases have been
reported. In the famous early case of Chappel v. Stewart,-" an injunction

was denied on the basis that equity would not protect a purely personal
right; but a later Texas case,2 -' in an analgous fact situation, granted such
relief, In Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate G. Ins. Co., recovery,

was permitted on the basis of defamation for "rough shadowing," even
though the technical requirements for defamation were lacking. Two
Georgia cases 2' allowed relief where investigative activities exceeded reasonable bounds. The court, in the instant case, reaffirmed 2 its belief in the
importance of the right of privacy, but recognized that the insurance company had a right to investigate the insured's claim, provided that such
investigation was conducted within reasonable bounds. In asking what is
reasonable tinder the circumstances, the court seemed to apply the only
practical yardstick for measuring the correlative rights and privileges of the
parties.
In recognizing the right of privacy, it becomes the duty of the courts
to bring into harmony the conflicting interests of the individual with those
of an increasingly complex society. Unquestionably, the practical difficulties
inherent in the very nature of the right (and its reciprocal remedy) 241based
on purely mental elements have been the retarding factors in the developnent of the law of privacy. This is hardly a valid reason for the denial of
such a fundamental spiritual need.-.l The right and the remedy are based
on reason, 28 surely no new concept to the field of jurisprudence.? Between
1890") and 1940, only eight states expressly affirmed the existence of the
right of privacy, 3 I but by 1956 this number has grown to twenty-four, with
no added jurisdictions denying the right. The impassioned pleading of the
many legal writers '2 who have written so eloquently in behalf of the recog-

21. 82 Md. 323, 33 At. 542 (1896).
22. Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233 ('ex. 1924).
23. 151 XVis. 537, 159 N.V. 386 (1913).
This is one of the few jurisdictions
that deny the existence of the right of privacy, yet the court permitted recovery, commenting ". . . that plaintiff wvas somewhat vague as to what particular law was breached
and defendant's conduct amounted to that species of unlawful conduct called eavesdropping, or constituted such restrain of liberty as to amount to false imprisonment or
that it was an invasion of privacy." (Italics supplied)
24. Young v. Western & A.R. Co., 39 Ga. App. 761, 148 S.E. 414 (1929); Newcomb Hotel v. Corbett, 27 Ga. App. 365, 108 S.E. 309 (1921).
25. Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 82 So.2d 61 (La. 1955).
26, Ubi jus ibi remediurn. BRoomr LEGAI. MAxIMs, 193 (8th ed. 1874).
27. See POuND, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality,
28 HARv. L. REv. 343 (1915); 29 HARy. L. Rwv. 640 (1916).
28, See RESTATEMENT, TORTs, § 867 (1939).
29. CARDozo, GROWTH OF Tlf. LAw (1924).
30. This is considered the birthday of the law of privacy, dating from the publication of the famous law review article of Warren and Brandeis. See note 3 supra.
31, 138 A.L.R. 22 (1940).
32. Warren & Brandeis, see note 30 supra; LARREIMORE, The Law of Privacy, 19
COL. L. REv. 437 (1912); Pound, see note 27 supra; RACLAND, The Right of Privacy,
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nition of the individual as an "inviolate personality" has not fallen on
deaf cars. The rapidly increasing tendency of the. courts to recognize the
right of an individual "to be let alone" is of practical significance to the
attorney whose client has been subjected to mental suffering because of
the "unwarranted, unreasonable, or unjustified" acts of another.
BERTHA L. FREIDUS

17 Ky. L.J. 85 (1929); NVINF1ELD, Privacy, 47 L.Q. REv. 23 (1931); KACEDAN, The
Right of Privacy, 12 Boston U. L. Rev. 353 (1932); DILER, Right of Privacy, 70
U.S.L. 435 (1937); NIZER, The Right of Privacy; a Half Century's Developments, 39
Mi !. L. REv. 713 (1941); FEINDERc, Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy,
48 CoL. L. Rev. 713 (1948); LuDwic, "Peace of Mind" in 48 Pieces v. Uniform Right
of Privacy, 32 MiNN . L. Rv. 734 (1948); YANKWNCVI, The Right of Privacy, 27
NOfTRE DAME L. 499 (1952).

